THE PUZZLE OF "EX ANTE EFFICIENCY':
DOES RATIONAL APPROVABILITY HAVE MORAL WEIGHT?
MATTHEW

D. ADLER

INTRODUCTION

What is the moral status of ex ante efficiency? Many within the
law and economics tradition seem to think that the ex ante efficiency
of legal institutions has moral weight-that legal officials have a moral
reason to create ex ante efficient institutions.' I think the view is questionable.

Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to Daniel Farber,
Eric Orts, the participants in the University of Pennsylvania Law School Symposium on
Preferences and Rational Choice, and my interlocutors at an ad hoc Penn Law workshop for their comments. Special thanks to Stephen Perry for his detailed, written
comments.
I A recent and visible attempt by two prominent law and economics scholars
to
specify the discipline's appropriate methodology explicitly defends, and at manyjunctures deploys, the criterion of ex ante efficiency. See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 437-43 (2002) (arguing for the ex ante perspective). A full assessment of the role that ex ante efficiency, in one sense or another, has
played within law and economics is well beyond the scope of this Article. It seems
clear, however, that this concept (in various specific formulations) has been quite important for this scholarly tradition. For recent examples of law and economics work
that, in evaluating legal doctrines or other legal institutions, explicitly invokes the criterion of "ex ante efficiency" or "ex ante welfare maximization" (a criterion that is,
again, specifiable in various ways), see Stephen J.Choi & Eric L. Talley, PlayingFavorites
with Shareholders, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 271 (2002); Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, AntiInsurance,31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral,100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001); Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585
(2000); Yongmin Chen, Promises, Trust, and Contracts, 16J.L. ECON. & ORG. 209 (2000);
Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1999); Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Andrew T. Guzman, An
Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775 (1999); Yeon-Koo
Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance,
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441 (1999); Omri Ben-Shahar, Should Products Liability Be Based
on Hindsight?, 14J.L. ECON. & ORG. 325 (1998). It also bears noting that Richard Posner's (in)famous defense of "wealth maximization" invoked an ex ante perspective by
arguing that judicial use of the wealth-maximization norm would, hypothetically, be
consented to by (almost) all actors choosing under conditions of uncertainty. See
RicHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OFJUSTICE 88-115 (1981) (exploring the "ethical
and political basis of wealth maximization").
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In this Article, I seek to undermine the view by attacking a more
general claim; the putative moral weight of ex ante efficiency is a particular variant of this generic claim, one that marries the claim with a
particular view about the nature of rationality. The generic claim is
that rational approvability has moral weight-that legal officials have
moral reason to choose actions that citizens would be rational to approve.
Part I fleshes out the concept of rational approvability and describes the link between rational approvability and ex ante efficiency.
Part II asks whether rational approvability has moral force given the
particular account of rationality dominant within economics: subjective expected utility (SEU). I consider various arguments for an affirmative answer-grounded in welfare, agency, stability, and the legal
official's own uncertainty-and reject them all. Part III assesses the
moral force of rational approvability on the assumption that SEU has
been replaced with alternative accounts of rationality. What is rational for someone to do or approve might be a matter of maximizing
objective expected utility,. realized utility, subjective expected value,
objective expected value, or realized value. I suggest that these variations on SEU either fail to be plausible accounts of rationality or, if
plausible, generally fail to support the claim that rational approvability
has moral weight.

Besides the Kaplow and Shavell opus, two other important recent attempts to defend the legal relevance of ex ante efficiency are Daniel A. Farber, Economic Efficiency
and the Ex Ante Perspective, in THEJURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORI'ORATE AND
COMMERCIAL LAw 54 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000); Christopher T.
Wonnell, Efficiency and Conservatim, 80 NEB. L. REV. 643 (2001). 1 do not discuss the
Wonnell, Farber, or Kaplow and Shavell defenses of ex ante efficiency here, in part because I am not sure that they mean to defend the version of ex ante efficiency I am
criticizing. My variant strictly incorporates the subjective expected utility (SEU) account of rationality standard within economics; the authors just mentioned might not
give weight to individuals' actual probabilistic beliefs if mistaken. See KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, supra, at 1330-34 (recognizing that individuals have imperfect information
and suggesting that, if the government has superior information, legal decisions
should reflect that); Wonnell, su)ra, at 682 n.105 (stating that the state's probability
estimates should govern where more accurate than the individual's, unless the latter
estimates are tied to personal identity). But see KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra, at 441
("If... individuals would unanimously prefer regime A to regime B if there were a referendum, we do not understand how it can be argued that, on occasions when no vote
is possible and thus the government officials themselves must decide between A and B,
they may pick B." (footnote omitted)).
The relevance of ex ante efficiency is, of course, a problem for welfare economics
generally, not just law and economics. For an overview of the literature, see Philippe
Mongin & Claude d'Aspremont, Utility Theory and Ethics, in I HANDBOOK OF UTILITY
THEORY 371, 437-44 (Salvador BarberA et al. eds., 1998).
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EFFICIENCYAND RATIONALITY

SEU is the standard account of rationality within economics, and
stipulates the following, given some actor in a choice situation at time
T, choosing among actions A 1 ... A,: (1) each choice, A,, can be represented as a lottery over possible worlds, where the probabilities in
the lottery are numerical measures of the actor's subjective degrees-ofbelief that the choice, if made, will result in the various possible outcomes; (2) the actor's preferences over possible worlds can be represented by a numerical "utility" function; (3) for each choice, an expected utility can be calculated by using the subjective probability
numbers in the matching lottery to discount the utilities of the various
possible outcomes, and then aggregating; and (4) the rational choice
is the choice with the largest expected utility.
It is common in law and economics scholarship to describe some
law, doctrine, rule, statute, or other legal institution as maximizing
everyone's expected utility and therefore "ex ante efficient." Note the
problems in this formulation, at least within an SEU account of expected utility. First, subjective expected utility, strictly construed, is a

2

Good introductions to the literature on rational choice, with a focus on SEU and

other such accounts structured in terms of the actual or possible outcomes resulting
from choice, include ELLERY FELLS, RATIONAL DECISION AND CAUSALITY (1982);
A DEFENSE OF THE EGOCENTRIC
RICHARD A. FUMERTON, REASON AND MORALITY:
PERSPECTIVE (1990); SIMON FRENCH, DECISION THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
AN
MATHEMATICS OF RATIONALITY (1988); MICHAEL D. RESNIK, CHOICES:
INTRODUCTION TO DECISION THEORY (1987). 1 take the term SEU from Eells. See
EELLS, supra, at 4-86 (presenting and discussing the SEU account). The classic presentations of SEU are Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Truth and Probability, in THE FOUNDATIONS
OF MATHEMATICS AND OTHER LOGICAL ESSAYS 156, 156-98 (R.B. Braithwaite ed., 1931);
LEONARDJ. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954); R.C. JEFFREY, THE LOGIC
OF DECISION (1965).
For support of the claim that SEU is the standard economic account of rational
choice, see JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND
INFORMATION 10 (1992) ("[W]e disregard [Frank] Knight's distinction [between risk
and uncertainty], which has proved to be a sterile one. For our purposes risk and uncertainty mean the same thing.... [W]e will be dealing throughout with a 'subjective'
probability ... : probability is simply degree of belief"). Perhaps the claim is too strong.
A weaker claim would be that the standard economic view of rationality is an expected
utility view, with either subjective or objective probabilities (i.e., either SEU or objective expected utility (OEU)). See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 112 (1990) ("The von Neumann-Morgenstern model, where probabilities are
objective, and the Savage... model, where probabilities are subjective, are the chief
models of consumer choice under uncertainty in microeconomics."). I argue below
against the moral force of rational approvability given OEU. Infra Part III.A. These
arguments would undermine the claim that ex ante efficiency, redefined in terms of
objective rather than subjective expected utilities, has moral weight.

1258

UN IVERSITY OFIPENNS YL VANIA LAWI

VIEW

[Vol. 151:1255

feature of each person's choices. What does it mean to speak of the
expected utility, for a person, of some other kind of thing-here, a legal institution? Second, subjective expected utility varies over time. A
person's subjective expected utility for her own choices (and presumably for derivative things, such as institutions) depends upon her
subjective probability assessments, which are not temporally fixed. A
person's probability assessment at some time, T, that some action will
produce some possible world may be different from her assessment at
another time, T2, that the action will produce that world.3 Legal institutions, however, endure over time. It is not as if a legal institution exists only at one moment and we can (somehow) use everyone's subjective probability numbers at that time to determine whether the
institution is ex ante efficient. So what time is relevant in determining
ex ante efficiency?
Here is an attempt to resolve the problems and provide a clearer
definition of ex ante efficiency. As just mentioned, rational choice
theory is, centrally, prescriptive for an actor with regard to the actor's
own choices. That is, the theory identifies the action, from the various
possible actions open to person Pin a choice situation, which Pwould
be rational to choose. P rationally orders the possible actions of P. By
extension, however, one can describe the rational ordering, by some
4
other person, of P's possible actions. Imagine an Agent and a Patient.
The Agent is in an actual choice situation. At a particular point in
time, T, he is choosing among actions /A 1 ... A, J. Since these are the
Agent's choices, not the Patient's, how does one construct a rational
ordering of the choices by the Patient? I suggest that one might ask
which choice by the Agent it would be rational for the Patient to approve. More precisely, we can imagine the Patient in a hypothetical
choice situation at 7, faced with the options (A,'. .. A, ', where each
A' is a determinative act of approval by the Patient: if the Patient
were to choose A,', the Agent would do A, ; if the Patient were to
choose A2', the Agent would do A 2 ; and so on. Since, at a minimum,
any theory of rational choice can rank choices, any theory will be able
to rank the Patient's hypothetical choices of approving one or another
of the various choices open to the Agent.

See infra notes 14, 36 (discussing the nature of probability, including subjective
probability, and specifically discussing temporal variation in subjective probabilities).
4 I use the term "Patient" because he is passive in this context-the
person to
whom choices are presented at Tis the Agent, not the Patient-and because his interests or welfare may be affected by the Agent's action. The Patient is someone whom
the Agent may need, morally, to take account of.
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With this concept of rational approvability in hand, we can provide the following definition of ex ante efficiency, one that treats ex
ante efficiency (as well as ex post efficiency) as a feature of particular,
institution-affecting choices by legal officials:
Ex Ante and Ex Post Efficiency: Imagine that a legal official, the "Agent," is

choosing among /A,.
A,] at some time 7. The Agent's choices may affect legal institutions in various ways; they may create, support, destroy,
or undermine such institutions. Some action A* by the Agent is "ex ante
efficient" if, for each individual in the population (each "Patient"), it
maximizes the Patient's subjective expected utility at T to approve A*,
rather than the other actions in /A,... . A]. Some action A+ by the
Agent is "ex post efficient" if the actual world that would result, were A+
to be chosen, is preferred by all Patients at T to the actual worlds that
/A,... A. .,:
would result, were the Agent to choose other actions from

This definition resolves the problems mentioned earlier. Given some
institution-affecting choice by an Agent at time T and some group of
"Patients" affected by the choice, for each individual Patient one can
coherently assign subjective expected utilities to the Agent's choices
and determine which choice it would maximize subjective expected
utility for that Patient, at T, to approve. If the maximizing choice by
the Agent, for all Patients, is the same choice, that choice is "ex ante
efficient."
The problem of determining ex ante efficiency, given the temporal variability in any person's subjective probability assignments, is also
solved by thinking of ex ante efficiency as a feature of particular institution-affecting choices by legal Agents. Choice situations presented
to Agents, unlike whole legal institutions, can be thought of as occurring at particular times; it is the affected persons subjective probabilities at the time of the Agent's choice that, I suggest, might be used to calculate the expected utilities that are determinative of ex ante efficiency.
Finally, the definition offered here draws a clean distinction between ex ante and ex post efficiency. It is common for legal scholars
to draw this distinction. "Ex ante" and "ex post" efficiency are seen as
5 The kind of efficiency defined here is, of course, Pareto
superiority. Ex ante Pareto superiority might mean that everyone ex ante prefers the choice, or that at least
one person does and no one prefers another choice. Similarly, ex post Pareto superiority might mean that everyone prefers the world that would result from the choice, or
that at least one person does and no one prefers another world. See Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 1073, 1075 (Kenneth
J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds., 1986) (distinguishing between "weak" and
"strong" versions of the Pareto principle). The difference between these variants of ex
ante and ex post efficiency is not relevant to my analysis in this Article, and the definition offered in the text is meant to be ambiguous between the variants.
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logically distinct properties of legal institutions: some institution
might be ex ante efficient but not ex post efficient, or vice versa. My
definition warrants this sort of talk. Given some Agent placed in a
choice situation at time T, choosing among [A.... A,, the choice
that some Patient "ex ante" prefers, versus the choice that she "ex
post" prefers-the choice that it maximizes subjective expected utility
for her to approve, versus the choice whose outcome she most prefers-clearly can be different. Thus, too, it might clearly occur that
the ex ante efficient choice by some Agent is not ex post efficient.
Ex ante and ex post efficiency, as I have clarified these concepts,
cannot be ascribed to institutions simpliciter. Rather, they are ascribable to particular choices by legal officials: to possible actions by
them, in particular choice situations at particular times. Is this a flaw
in my conceptualization? I don't think so. If we are to preserve the
standard link between ex ante efficiency and the SEU account of rationality, I see no way to license talk of the ex ante efficiency of an institution simpliciter, detached from a particular time. Again, subjective probability assessments vary over time.
And since SEU is
fundamentally an account of rational choice, defining ex ante efficiency as, first and foremost, a feature of choices-and derivatively, of
legal institutions, relative to particular choices that affect the institutions-seems the natural way to proceed. At a minimum, the choicebased account is a plausible conceptualization of ex ante efficiency
and is the one I shall rely upon in this Article.
6 What alternative accounts are there? Consider these possibilities: an institution
is ex ante efficient if (1) everyone prefers the world in which the institution exists to
the world in which the institution does not exist; (2) everyone prefers the "nearest possible world" (to the actual world) in which the institution exists to the nearest possible
world in which the institution does not exist; (3) everyone prefers a lottery over the
possible worlds in which the institution exists to a lottery over the possible worlds in
which the institution does not exist; or (4) everyone, at the time of the creation of the
institution, prefers a lottery over the possible worlds in which the institution exists to a
lottery over the possible worlds in which the institution does not exist.
The problems with (1) are that probability assessments and expected utility do not
come into play here and further that institutions exist, and fail to exist, in multiple
worlds; unless a person prefers all the worlds in which the institution exists to all the
worlds in which the institution fails to exist, her preference will be undefined. The
problem with (2) is that this, like (I), provides a conception of ex post, not ex ante,
efficiency; as with (1), the preferences here are preferences over worlds represented by
utility numbers, not preferences over lotteries represented by expected utilities calculated using subjective probabilities. The problem with (3) is that there are multiple
times at which persons might be making the expected utility calculations over the lotteries; unless a person's expected utility at all times for the institution lottery is greater
than her expected utility for the no-institution lottery, her preference over the lotteries
will be undefined. Finally, the problem with (4) is that institutions are not necessarily
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Given this definition of ex ante efficiency, the claim that ex ante
efficiency has moral force emerges as a particular version of the generic claim that rational approvability has moral force.7 Is the claim
true? Imagine that an Agent is choosing among [A.... A }.For some
Patient, it would be rational to approve A*. Does the Agent therefore
have moral reason to perform A*? 8 If so, and if SEU in particular is
the correct account of rationality, it follows that ex ante efficiency has
moral force. The premise that rational approvability possesses moral
weight is intuitively plausible. This premise, or something like it, may
well be what motivates the defenders of ex ante efficiency. In any
event, the premise bears scrutiny.
II. DOES RATIONAL APPROVABILITY HAVE MORAL WEIGHT?
THE SEU ACCOUNT OF RATIONALITY

In this Part, I consider and reject various arguments why choices
by legal officials should, morally, be guided by the rational ordering of
those choices by citizens-on the assumption that SEU is the correct
account of rationality. Alternative accounts of rationality will be considered below, in Part III. In the analysis that follows, the legal official
is the Agent, deciding what policy to put in place, what doctrine to
enact, what.judgment to issue, etc., while citizens are the Patients with
ex ante preferences over the Agent's choices. I use the term "ex ante
preference," here and throughout the Article, as shorthand for
"maximizes subjective expected utility." The Patient "ex ante prefers"

created at canonical times; institutions might come into existence gradually, with no
clear answer to the question, "When does the institution start to exist?" Assuming
there is a single time at which a given institution comes into existence, (4) is fairly
close to my own analysis of ex ante efficiency, and the arguments advanced in this Article could readily be adapted to show that ex ante efficiency as per (4) lacks moral
weight.
On these issues, I am indebted to Stephen Perry for extensive, written comments
that, among other things, incisively engaged the problem of defining ex ante efficiency
and preference. See Stephen Perry, Comments on Manuscript (Mar. 1, 2002) (on file
with author).
7 More precisely, as I explain in the Conclusion, infra,
the claim that rational approvability has moral force, given SEU, provides one important argument in favor of
the moral relevance of ex ante efficiency. This is not the only possible argument.
Even if rational approvability lacks moral weight (in general, or on an SEU account of
rationality), ex ante efficiency could, in theory, have moral weight.
By "moral reason," of course, I mean a prima facie or pro tanto moral reason of
some kind, not a conclusive moral reason. It would be absurd to suggest that, because
some Patient rationally approves A*, the morally appropriate choice for the Agent, all
things considered, is necessarily A*.
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some choice by the Agent at T if and only if it is rational for the Patient, at T, to approve the choice, given SEU.
A. Welfare: Outcomes
Plausibly, the Agent has moral reason in favor of choices that improve the Patient's welfare. More precisely, the fact that the outcome
of some choice A, by the Agent is better for the Patient's welfare than
the outcome of some other choice A 2 is plausibly a moral consideration for the Agent in favor of A."
Is there, in turn, a link between what is rational for the Patient to
approve and her welfare? More precisely, if it is rational for the Patient to approve A, over A 2, and A, leads to outcome (possible world)' °
W rather than W, does it follow that W is better for the Patient's welfare than W2? I think not. To begin, there is arguably a disjunction
between welfare and preference. Two basic views of welfare are defended within the philosophical literature: preferentialist and substantive. Preferentialists reduce welfare to preference-satisfaction;
substantivists, to the attainment of welfare values such as enjoyment,
accomplishment, agency, personal relations, and knowledge." On a
substantive view of welfare, the Patient might prefer W to W 2 even
though W is better for her. For example, her preferences over outcomes might be motivated by altruistic considerations rather than her
own welfare. If, further, the Patient has a sufficiently high subjective

9 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of
Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 241, 302-13 (2000) (arguing for moral force of overall
well-being).
10"Possible worlds" play a substantial role in my analysis. For an introduction
to

this important concept, see MICHAEL J. Loux, METAPHYSICS: A CONTEMPORARY
INTRODUCTION 176-214 (2002). In this Article, I use the term "outcome" to mean a
possible world.
11 On the nature of welfare, see generally JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING:
ITS
MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE7-72 (1986); DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS 493-502 (1984); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH
OTHER 108-43 (1998); L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 45-137 (1996);
Mozaffar Qizilbash, The Concept of Well-Being, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 51 (1998). The hedonic view of welfare might be seen as a type of substantive account-one that makes
pleasure the only welfare value. Hybrid views are possible (for example, a view that
says an outcome is better if, and only if, both preferred and substantively better) as are
other modifications of the basic views (for example, a view that gives welfare weight
only to a particular subset of preferences), but for simplicity I consider only the basic
views. If, as I argue, the simple preferentialist view doesn't warrant the claim that rational approvability has moral force, then a fortiori hybrid or modified views won't either.
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probability that A, leads to W, she will rationally choose A, and get W
notwithstanding the fact that W2 ranks higher than W, with respect to
the Patient's own well-being.
Even bracketing the disjunction between preference-satisfaction
and welfare, I think it is quite clear that an outcome resulting from
the action that the Patient ex ante prefers need not be best for the Patient's welfare. One reason is intuitive. It is a truism that a person can
be lucky or unlucky with respect to her welfare. Perhaps moral luck is
impossible; 2 but, intuitively, it seems that welfare luck is quite possible
indeed. If I pay $100,000 for a lottery ticket with a prize of $1 million,
where the probability of winning the lottery is 1 in 1 million, and end
up winning the lottery, then intuitively I have chosen an action (playing the lottery) that was irrational for me (at least if my choice situation included the option of not playing) but nonetheless resulted in
the better outcome for my welfare.
A further reason is given by the structure of SEU itself. SEU drives
a wedge between a person's preferences over outcomes and what is
rational for a person to choose or approve. Imagine that A, will in fact
lead to W and A2 will in fact lead to 142, where the person prefers W2
to W,. Within SEU, of course, which action it is rational for the person to choose or approve depends (in part) on her subjective assessment of the likelihood that A, or A 2 will result in W or W2. If, for example, the person prefers W2 to W, but (incorrectly) believes it to be
highly likely that A, will lead to W2, and that A2 will lead to W, thenwithin SEU-she rationally chooses A, even though its outcome, W, is
not the outcome she prefers.
One might try to circumvent the objection from SEU itself by distinguishing between "proto-preferences" and "final preferences."
Modify SEU as follows: each person has proto-preferences over possible worlds; he rationally chooses or approves actions, depending on
his proto-preferences plus his subjective probability assessments; a
person's final preferences over outcomes track his rational choices;
and a person's welfare ranking of outcomes tracks his final preferences (not his proto-preferences). So, if A, leads to W and A 2 leads to
W2 but rationally approves A, beW2, and our Patient proto-prefers
cause of his limited information and the subjective probabilities
grounded therein, the Patient's final preference is for W (the out-

2

For a discussion of the problem of moral luck, with citations to the literature,

see Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 237 (1994).
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come of the ex ante preferable A,) over W2 (the outcome of the ex
ante dispreferable A,). Why not thus salvage the claim that the outcomes of rationally approvable actions are better for those who rationally approve them?
One answer, again, is the intuition that welfare luck is possible.
Having welfare track final preferences makes welfare luck impossible.
A more technical point is that a person's final preferences between outcomes are often undefined. A person has a final preference
between two possible worlds, W and Wj, only if the worlds are linked
by someone's choice: only if there is some choice situation where one
possible action leads to W and another leads to W. For many pairs of
possible worlds, there will be no such link.) 3 Thus the Patient's finalpreference ranking of possible worlds (unlike his proto-preference
ranking) will be very "gappy." But it is presumably a desideratum in a
theory of welfare that it enable a more, rather than less, complete
ranking of outcomes.
Intertemporal variation in preferences poses another obstacle to
the putative link between the Patient's final-preference ranking of
possible worlds and the goodness of those outcomes for his welfare.
Consider W and W2, where W would result from choice A, by the
Agent at time 7, W would result from choice A, by the Agent at time
T, and the Patient ex ante prefers A,. The Patient's ex ante preference for A, is a product (by definition) of his proto-preference ranking over outcomes (standardly assumed to be temporally fixed), plus
his subjective probabilities at T, linking the choices available to the
Agent with the set of possible outcomes. As already mentioned, the
Patient's subjective probabilities cannot be assumed to be temporally
fixed. They depend on the temporally variable information available
to the Patient. 4 But it seems arbitrary to give priority to the Patient's
contemporaneous preference with respect to the Agent's choices, over
his prior or subsequent preference, in determining the Patient's finalpreference ranking of outcomes. Certainly the Patient's contemporaneous preferences have priority in determining what is rational for the
13 Alternatively, for a given pair of possible
worlds, could there be multiple choice
situations such that, in each situation, one choice leads to one world and another to
the other? I'm not sure. If so, a different indeterminacy problem arises, since a given
person might rationally choose or approve the choice leading to one world in one
situation, but not in the other situation. Just as the existence of no choice-link between
two worlds creates an indeterminacy in the final-preference ranking, so might the existence of multiple choice-links.
14 On intertemporal variability in subjective probabilities,
see, for example, HENRY
E. KYBURG,JR., PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LoGic 68-74 (1970).
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Patient to choose at a given moment. But we are asking, rather, what
it is moral and rational for the Agent to choose at a given moment. Insofar as the Patient's preferences should bear on the Agent's choice, it
is hard to see why the temporal location of those preferences makes a
difference. Informational quality, sincerity, coherence, and other attributes of preference might make a moral difference." However, the
correlation between these features and temporal location is contingent, not conceptual, and in the case of informational quality it is subsequent, not contemporaneous, preferences that typically will be best
informed.
The point about intertemporal variation will push us away from
contemporaneous preferences, and may lead to greater indeterminacy
in the Patient's final-preference ranking. At all points in time, the Patient has preferences over the Agent's choices at T. The Patient's ex
ante (i.e., contemporaneous) preference is for A,; but at other times,
the Patient (with different information) may prefer a different action
open to the Agent at T One solution is to determine the Patient's final-preference ranking by looking to the Patient's actual preferences
at that point in time (not necessarily contemporaneous with T) when
his preferences most satisfy informational or other criteria. This solution gives moral force to rational approvability by the Patient, but not
to ex ante efficiency, since ex ante efficiency as I have conceptualized
it is grounded in ex ante preference-in the fact that some choice by
the Agent is universally, contemporaneously, and rationally approved
by all Patients. Another solution is to withdraw attention from the Patient's actual preferences at any point in time, and look instead to his
idealized (say, fully informed) preferences. This moves us away from
the SEU account of rational approvability entirely-at least insofar as
the idealizing conditions involve full or fuller-than-actual information-since SEU makes it rational for a person to choose or approve
the action he prefers given his actual, subjective probabilities, not the
action he would prefer under full or fuller information. The third putative solution says that W, resulting from A, is finally preferred by the
Patient over W resulting from A 2, just in case the Patient at all times
actually prefers that the Agent choose A,. This is no solution at all,
since in many cases intertemporal variation in the Patient's informa-

Many philosophers who think that preferences have a role within the correct
account of well-being believe that the relevant preferences must be "fully informed" or
otherwise idealized. See generally David Sobel, Full Information Accounts of Well-Being, 104
ETHICS 784, 790-96 (1994) (discussing accounts of well-being that look to fully informed preferences).
15
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tion will preclude him from having an intertemporally invariant preference for any one choice by the Agent. The upshot of this third "solution" is that the Patient will often lack a final-preference ranking,
not just between outcomes unlinked by anyone's choice, but even between outcomes thus linked.' 6
B.

Welfare: Actions

The preceding Section relied, implicitly, on a consequentialist
view of welfare. I argued that the possible world, or "outcome," VW resulting from an action rationally approvable by some Patient need not
be better for the Patient's welfare. I also described problems in generating a "final-preference" ranking of possible worlds that is derivative from the Patient's rational ordering of actions available to an
Agent. But why assume that the welfare significance or, more generally, the moral weight of some action is reducible to the goodness of
outcomes? Couldn't A, be better for the Patient's welfare than A 2,
even though the outcome resulting from A, is no better for the Patient
than the outcome resulting from A 2?
I believe that consequentialism, at least about welfare, is correct,
but this is a large and controversial claim that cannot be defended
here." More narrowly, consequentialism about welfare and about
morality in general is arguably presupposed by SEU-but this narrower claim may be untrue too. 8 Thus, I will entertain the possibility
16 What about a different, consequentialist version of the argument
from welfare:
not that the rational approvability of A* by some Patient entails that W* resulting from
A* is all-things-considered better for the Patient than other outcomes of the Agent's
choices, but rather (more weakly) that the rational approvability of A* provides the
Agent a prima facie moral reason, grounded in the Patient's welfare, to choose A*?
The claim, in short, would be this: W* is in one respect better than the worlds resulting from the alternatives to A* because the Patient rationally approves A*. This argument founders on the intrinsic/instrumental distinction, considered below in a different context. Infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. It is true that, if the Patient
intrinsically prefers A, and if preferentialism about welfare is true, then W* resulting
from A* is in one respect better than the worlds resulting from the alternativ'e choices.
But rational approvability and intrinsic preferability are different things. The Patient
might well lack any intrinsic preference for A* and approve it purely on instrumental
grounds. An action for which a person lacks an intrinsic preference can readily maximize her subjective expected utility, because the possible causal upshots of the action
may provide the greatest expected satisfaction of the person's intrinsic preferences, as
compared to other actions.
7 For an excellent collection of philosophical essays debating consequentialism,
see CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Samuel Scheffier ed., 1988).
18 This narrower claim seemingly follows from
the premise that moral "oughts"
generate rational "oughts." Assume that some consideration is a moral reason for the
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that both SEU, as an account of rationality, and nonconsequentialism
about morality and welfare are true. This brings us back to the suggestion that A,'s rational approvability by the Patient might make it
better for the Patient's welfare than A2-and thereby create a moral
reason for the Agent-even though the outcome resulting from A, is
no better for the Patient than the outcome resulting from A2.
In the preceding Section, I contrasted preferentialist and substantive views of welfare. Preferentialist views reduce a Patient's welfare to
the satisfaction of the Patient's preferences while substantive views reduce a Patient's welfare to the realization of welfare values such as enjoyment, accomplishment, agency, personal relations, and knowledge.
Set aside agency, as there may well be a conceptual link between
agency and rational approvability. I think it is quite clear that the remaining entries on the list of plausible welfare values are not conceptually linked to rational approvability-at least if rational approvability
is specified in line with SEU. 9 Consider enjoyment. The most enjoyable object for the Patient (be it an action or some other object) is not
necessarily the object that the Patient most prefers. Enjoyability is a
complex hybrid of (1) the subject's positive feelings or physical sensa-

Agent to choose A, only if the consideration makes it rational for the Agent to choose
A,, ceteris paribus. Now, consider the case of choice by a perfectly informed Agent.
Where the Agent is perfectly informed, according to SEU the only considerations that
can influence what is rational for the Agent with respect to some choice set of possible
actions are considerations that influence his preferences over the possible worlds resulting from those actions. Given some feature of A, that supposedly makes it better
for the Patient's well-being than A2, a perfectly informed Agent choosing in accordance with SEU would not be influenced by this feature of A, unless it makes the outcome resulting from A, better, in some way, than the outcome resulting from A2 .
However, the premise upon which this argument depends-that moral "oughts" generate rational "oughts"-is itself too large and controversial to defend here.
19 Different, plausible lists of substantive
welfare values are identified in the literature. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 90 (1980) (listing
seven basic forms of good, including "life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience,
friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion");JAMES GRIFFIN, VALUEJUDGEMENT:
IMPROVING OUR ETHICAL BELIEFS 29-30 (1996) (providing a "general profile of prudential values," including "accomplishment," "components of human existence," "understanding," "enjoyment," and "deep personal relations"); GEORGE SHER, BEYOND
NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 199-244 (1997) (defending and expanding
upon Derek Parfit's list of goods, that includes "moral goodness, rational activity, the
development of one's abilities, having children and being a good parent, knowledge,
and the awareness of true beauty" (citation omitted)); Robert E. Goodin & David
Parker, Introduction to Symposium on Martha Nussbaum's Political Philosophy, 111 ETHICS
5, 6-7 (2000) (providing a list of the "central human capabilities," including "life,"
"bodily health," "bodily integrity," "senses, imagination and thought," "emotions,"
"practical reason," "affiliation," "other species," "play," and "control over one's environment").
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ions; (2) the degree to which the object merits those feelings; and
(3) the subject's preference for the feelings. Preference is not the
whole story-and if this is true for a relatively subjective value such as
enjoyment, it is true a fortiori for more objective values such as knowledge, personal relations, or accomplishment. Beliefs must be true
(not merely desired) to be instances of knowledge; relationships must
be minimally honest, reciprocal, nonabusive, etc., to be valuable; and
blade-of-grass-counting or sitcom-watching, however strongly preferred, are not real accomplishments. In short, the substantive welfare values identified by a substantive account of welfare either are realized wholly independent of the welfare subject's preferencesatisfaction or at least (with the possible exception of agency) are not
reducible to his preference-satisfaction .
Consider, now, the preferentialist view of welfare. Shifting to that
view, from the substantive view of welfare, seemingly strengthens the
case for the moral (welfare) force of rational approvability. And the
combination of (1) preferentialism about welfare; and (2) nonconsequentialism makes that case especially strong. The Patient ex ante
prefers A, to A2. With the strictures of consequentialism no longer
binding, A, might be said to benefit the Patient regardless of how W,
and W fare in light of her preferences, proto-preferences, or final
preferences. With substantive welfare values out of the picture, does it
not follow that an action benefits the Patient just in case she ex ante
prefers it?
That conclusion does not follow. The full-information preferentialist will deny it.. And it does not follow even for the preferentialist
who looks to actual, rather than fully informed, preferences. The

20

Although there could well be a conceptual link between welfare values and fully

informed, or otherwise idealized, preferences, see, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 298-99
(arguing for such a connection), SEU looks to actual preferences, not idealized ones.
What about the point, to which I allude in the text, that a substantive value might
make actual preference-satisfaction a partial condition for the value's realization?
Imagine that some action is better for some person's attainment of welfare value Vif,
and only if, (1) the person prefers the action; and (2) other conditions obtain? Imagine now that the Agent is faced with a choice of actions, all of which satisfy the nonpreferentialist conditions for V with respect to the Patient. Wouldn't the Patient's
preference for A* (by triggering the realization of V) generate a welfarist reason for

the Agent to choose A *? I would respond to this question by adducing my arguments,
immediately below, against the moral force of rational approvability given a preferentialist account of welfare. Infra text accompanying notes 21-24. If those arguments are
sound, then they should also hold good when the welfare account is replaced with one
that is substantive but incorporates some values that make preference-satisfaction a
partial condition for their realization.
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problem of intertemporal variation in the Patient's preferences over
the Agent's choices at time Tlooms once more. It is arbitrary to insist
that the Patient's ex ante (contemporaneous) preference, rather than
her subsequent or prior preferences, determine which choice by the
Agent at T is best for the Patient's welfare. Either we use criteria of
welfare-relevance (sincerity, coherence, etc.) to identify the point in
time such that the Patient's actual preferences at that point determine
which choice by the Agent at T is best for the Patient; or we give
weight to each moment in the Patient's life and stipulate that the best
choice by the Agent at T for the Patient's welfare is some function of
the set of the Patient's preferences at all moments over the Agent's
choices at T. In either case, we have abandoned ex ante efficiency.
And in the latter case, at least, if we refuse to make intertemporal
comparisons between the Patient's preferences, there will typically be
no determinate answer to the question: "Which choice by the Agent
does the Patient prefer?" Such indeterminacy, of course, eliminates
rational approvability by the Patient as a possible moral consideration
for the Agent.
A different point goes to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental preference. 2 The Patient might prefer A, to A2 independently (in part)2" of their expected causal upshots; or he might prefer
A/ to A2just by virtue of their expected causal upshots. Sweet singing
by the Agent, say; might be preferable for the Patient because he intrinsically prefers sweet to sour singing-because sweet singing is
something he just likes-or instead because the Patient believes that
sour singing is likely to disturb the Patient's sleeping child. In the latter, wholly instrumental case, it is hard to see why the Patient's ex ante
preference has moral weight for the Agent-even within a preferentialist and nonconsequentialist view of welfare. Imagine that the
Agent is an expert in pediatric audiology, who knows that sour, not
sweet, singing tends to soothe sleeping children. Should the2 :Agent,
seeking to advance the Patient's welfare, sing sweetly or sourly?

21 On the intrinsic/instrumental distinction, see, for example, THOMAS
CARSON,

VALUE AND THE GOOD LIFE 155-58 (2000).
22 I say "in part" because, even where a person has an intrinsic preference
for
some action, his decision to choose or approve that action should, rationally, be
grounded not merely on that intrinsic preference, but also on his intrinsic preferences
for or against the possible causal upshots of the action. If I intrinsically like sweet singing, but believe that this particular instance of sweet singing will trigger a bomb that
will injure me, then I rationally should not choose or approve the singing.
2. Note that, even where the Patient intrinsically prefers some action
by the Agent,
it remains hard to see why the rational approvability of that action has moral weight for
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The case for singing sweetly, I suppose, rests on a robust antipaternalism: (1) preferentialism makes each person sovereign with respect to his welfare; and (2) individual "sovereignty" here means that
an individual's welfare is mediated not just by his intrinsic preferences, but by his intrinsic preferences plus his beliefs (correct or not),
i.e., promoting someone's welfare means satisfying her intrinsic or instrumental preferences. Antipaternalism this robust is not incoherent, but it strikes me as counterintuitive-and much stronger, I
should note, than the variants of antipaternalism most widely accepted within the philosophical literature." Antipaternalism this robust is particularly counterintuitive, and perhaps borderline incoherent, in the case where the Patient himself is "deferential": where he
prefers that suitably characterized experts give weight to their own
subjective probabilities, not the Patient's, in advancing the Patient's
welfare. The incoherence could be avoided by weakening the antipaternalist view just described to state that the ex ante preferences of
nondeferential Patients-whether these ex ante preferences are
wholly instrumental or, rather, are grounded in part in an intrinsic
preference for the action preferred-have moral force for Agents.
This is more plausible-but note that the claim that ex ante preference, per se, possesses moral force has been abandoned.
C. Agency: Outcomes
What if we focus on the Patient's agency, rather than her welfare?
Plausibly, the Agent has moral reason to advance the Patient's agency:

the Agent. What has moral weight is the intrinsic preference, not the rational approvability ("ex ante preference"), since the latter incorporates probability assessments
that the Agent, if more expert in his causal judgments than the Patient, should seemingly discount. See supra note 16 (distinguishing between intrinsic preferability and
rational approvability). This problem for the putative force of rational approvability
emerges particularly clear in the kind of case, discussed in the text, where the Patient
has no intrinsic preference for the action rationally approved. However, the problem
for the putative force of rational approvability is really more general than that.
24 For discussions of paternalism, see
GERALD DwORKIN, THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988); JOHN KULTGEN, AUTONOMY AND INTERVENTION:

PARENTALISM IN THE CARING LIFE (1995); DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC
INTERVENTION (1986); Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, I CAN. J. PHIL. 105 (1971).
The view is stronger in the following sense: most antipaternalists do not doubt that an
Agent can improve a Patient's welfare by performing actions the Patient does not want
performed (specifically, by rejecting the Patient's probability assessments and acting in
the teeth of the Patient's instrumental preferences). Rather, antipaternalists generally
claim that Agents are precluded from performing such actions on liberty, or other
nonwelfarist, grounds.
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either as one aspect of welfare (on a substantive rather than preferentialist account of welfare which makes agency one of various substantive values), or independent of welfare. Assume, for the moment, that
consequentialism about morality is correct. Then the Agent's moral
reason to advance the Patient's agency is a moral reason to produce
possible worlds that are better in light of the Patient's agency.
What makes one possible world, W, better than another, W , in
light of the Patient's agency? Advancing someone's agency could
mean advancing her (1) capacity for choice; (2) range of choice; (3)
extent of choice; (4) quality of choice; or (5) a hybrid of these, to list
some salient possibilities. VW. is better than W with respect to the Patient's choice-capacity if she is better educated, smarter, more thoughtful, and so on in W than in W. W is better than W with respect to the
Patient's choice-range if the totality of sets of possible worlds accessible
from her choice situations in W is better for the Patient's welfare
(given a welfare measure applicable to sets of outcomes and appropriate for this context, such as the average or maximum welfare) than
the totality of sets of possible worlds accessible from her choice situations in W. W is better than W with respect to the Patient's choiceextent if she makes more choices in W, than in W. Wi is better than W
with respect to the quality of the Patient's choices if the percentage of
her choices in W that are rational is higher than the percentage of her
choices in W.
Clearly, the link between the Patient's rational ordering of the
Agent's actions, and the agency-ranking of the outcomes of those actions (with respect to choice-capacity, -range, -extent, -quality, or some
hybrid), is quite contingent. Consider capacity. The Patient might
rationally, but unluckily, approve a choice by the Agent that leaves the
Patient dead, comatose, impulsive, stupid, or otherwise impaired in
her capacity for choice. Similar points hold true regarding range, extent, and quality. First, the Patient's preferences over outcomes might
not track their goodness for her agency. Second (and this kind of
point should be very familiar by now) even the agency-maximizing Patient might rationally, but unluckily, choose actions with outcomes
that diminish agency-given the role of subjective probabilities in determining what is rational within SEU.
The proponent of ex ante preference might try to draw a tighter
link between rational approvability and agency. She might say that W
is better than W for the Patient's agency just in case, for all choice
situations by Agents where A would result in W and A. would result in
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Wj, the Patient rationally approves A, over A. This is, in effect, the final-preference gambit, which I have already discussed and rejected.25
D. Agency: Actions
In discussing the welfare-relevance of rational approvability, I considered first consequentialist and then nonconsequentialist arguments
for a link between the Patient's ex ante preference and his welfare.
Agency, too, must be considered in both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist variants. The nonconsequentialist variant says this:
where the Patient rationally approves A, over A 2, that fact provides the
Agent a reason (grounded in the Patient's agency) to choose A, regardless of whether the outcomes resulting from A, would be better
for the Patient's agency.
This argument will perhaps seem more familiar and persuasive if
phrased in the language of consent. The Patient rationally approves
A, over A 2. In effect, he consents to A, over A 2. But consent has moral
force. Therefore the Agent has moral reason (nonconsequentialist in
structure) to choose A, over A 2.
Does the argument work? Note that it rests on the Patient's hypothetical, not actual, consent. The Agent is considering (A.... A J. A*
is rational for the Patient to approve; specifically, since SEU is our
current theory of rationality, A* is the possible action that the Patient
ex ante prefers. This feature of A* does not entail that the Patient has
actually chosen A* A person can ex ante prefer an option without actually choosing that option, indeed without thinking about the option
at all. The Patient's ex ante preference for A* is inferred from his
preferences over possible worlds, plus his subjective probabilitiesover possible worlds conditional on A*. Both preferences and subjective
probabilities (as beliefs) are dispositional. They entail what the Patient would choose, but exist at all times-and generate ex ante preferences over contemporaneous choices by other Agents at all timeswhether or not the Patient actually engages in choice and thought."'
Note further that a Patient who is actually engaged in choice contemporaneous with the Agent's choice-who is consciously engaged in
deciding whether to approve /A.... Aj-need not pick A*, even
25

Supra text accompanying notes 13-16.

26 See DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND

MORAL PIIILOSOPHY 28 (1996) ("We regard Q's preference ranking as a subjective state
of Q that, along with Q's beliefs, explains her choices.");JAEGWON KIM, PHILOSOPHY OF
MIND 158-59 (1996) (noting that beliefs and desires need not be occurrent).
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though A'is the rational choice for the Patient to approve. After all,
the Patient's actual choices can be irrational. A person's rational ordering is at best a fallible predictor of his actual choices.
Rational approvability is logically linked to hypothetical, rather than
actual, consent-specifically, to hypothetical rational consent. To say
that the Patient ex ante prefers A* is to say that the Patient would
choose A*, if hypothetically he were faced with the choice of approving A* or the other options and were to choose rationally in accordance with SEU. But why think that this kind of hypothetical consent
has moral force? Some theorists insist that no hypothetical consent
has moral force, rather that consent must be actual to be morally
powerful. 7 It is also plausible to think that hypothetical, fully informed consent, in addition to (or in lieu of) actual consent, has
moral force.8 Crucially, however, the Patient's hypothetical consent
to A* is not fully informed. The Patient would hypothetically approve
A* were she to choose rationally, given her subjective probabilities.
But those are in turn grounded in whatever incomplete stock of information the Patient possesses at the time of the Agent's choice. A
person's subjective probabilities are numerical representations of her
beliefs (where 1 represents a belief she holds with certainty, 0 represents no belief, and a number between 0 and 1 represents a belief she
holds with some degree of uncertainty). There is absolutely no requirement in SEU, or in the concepts of ex ante preference and ex
ante efficiency, that the person holding such probabilistic beliefs be
fully informed. Were there such a requirement, the distinction between ex ante and ex post preference-between preferences over actions and preferences over outcomes-would dissolve, at least in a
universe operating under deterministic laws. Fully informed persons
would have a subjective probability of 1 that each A i would result in its
actual upshot, W, and a subjective probability of 0 that each action
would result in any other outcome. But, of course, subjective probabilities within SEU can deviate from both 0 and 1. This deviation (in
a deterministic universe) reflects the deviation between the ex ante
preferences of a fully informed Patient-whose probabilities would be

27

See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2203,

2305 (1992) ("[H]ypothetical consent lacks just the element that makes an act of consent morally significant; namely, consent.").
28

Cf MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM 151-52,

155-61 (1994)

(analyzing

normative reasons in terms of "fully rational" desires, where "full rationality" includes
full information).
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only Is and Os-and the ex ante preferences of an actual, possibly partially uninformed, Patient.29
Nor can the supposition that the universe is indeterministic salvage the argument from the moral force of hypothetical fully informed consent to the moral force of ex ante preference. Fully informed individuals would have subjective probabilities that track the
objective, physical probabilities 0° There is no requirement in SEU
that individuals' probabilities track the objective, physical probabilities. To insist on that is to abandon SEU and erect instead some variant of objective expected utility-a theory of rationality where the rational choice for an actor depends on relative frequencies or on the
objectively warranted partial beliefs (objective probabilities), rather
than her actual partial beliefs (subjective probabilities). SEU captures
the thought that what is rational for a person-as opposed to what is
most valuable for her, or what is the right thing for her to do-depends on her actual beliefs and preferences, which can deviate from
objective truths or values. Neither in a deterministic nor an indeterministic universe does SEU stipulate that a given Patient's probability
assignment must match the probability assignment of a fully informed
Patient.
Hypothetical consent might be morally powerful even if uninformed. Rawls's veil of ignorance provides a famous example. For
Rawls, hypothetical choice under conditions of radical informational
limitations is the mark ofjustice. 3' But Rawls's choosers are systematically uninformed-stripped of all information about their personal
circumstances and endowments-so that their rational choices track
what would be morally reasonable for them to choose. The Patient in
our scenario is arbitrarily uninformed. He has whatever information
he has managed to accumulate up until the point in time when the
Agent makes her choice. Based on that historically contingent stock
of information-one that has not been structured and restricted in
light of some moral theory, such as Rawls's-we determine the Patient's subjective probabilities and, thereby, what he ex ante prefers.
Yet it is very hard to see why hypothetical consent by arbitrarily unin-

29 Cf Stephen

R.

Perry,

Risk,

Harm and Responsibility, in

PHILOSOPHICAL

FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw 321, 330-39 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (discussing connection between probability and determinism).
30 See infra text accompanying note 38 (discussing objective, physical probabilities).
.1JOHN RAWLS, A THEORYOFJUSTICE (1971).

20031

THE PUZZLE OF "EXANTEIFICIENCY"

1275

formed persons-neither fully informed, nor uninformed in a structured and morally appropriate way-would possess moral force.
Again, abandoning SEU could be a solution-one we will consider
below. Arguably, if all Patients under conditions of morally structured
ignorance (such as Rawlsian radical ignorance) would approve some
choice by the Agent, then the Agent has moral reason in favor of that
choice. Ex ante efficiency might have moral force if defined in terms
of ex ante preferences under morally special informational conditions. Notably, however, most scholarly proponents of ex ante efficiency do not assume such conditions (for example, the actor's ignorance of his own cost structure, abilities, or tastes).82 Relatedly, it is a
delicate matter to build morally appropriate informational conditions
into a theory of rationality. What I am asking, in this Article, is
whether the rational approvability for some person of some actor's
option creates a moral reason for the actor in favor of the option-not
whether the person's hypothetical consent to the option under certain conditions of partial information does. In any event, given the
standard SEU account of rationality, rational approvability lacks moral
force qua hypothetical consent because there need be no special
structure to the Patient's beliefs whatsoever (beyond their conforming
to the probability calculus).
E. Stability
Sometimes a link is drawn between ex ante efficiency and the
value of stability.33 Assume the Agent at time Tis choosing between A,
and A 2, where A, is universally ex ante preferred. Then A 2 is, supposedly, unstable. Were the Agent to choose A2, everyone would agree to
override that choice and choose A, instead. Or so the argument goes.
Note that other actors could not literally reverse the Agent's
choice of A 2. A 2 is a particular action (bodily movement) by the Agent
which, once performed, is an irrevocable feature of the past. Nor

32 For example, none of the authors cited in footnote one,
as I read them, presuppose that the partial information generating ex ante preferences, and thereby ex
ante efficiency, is itself structured by moral considerations. Farber does assume structured uncertainty A la Rawls, but only at the threshold stage of choice between legal
principles-which, he argues, eventuates in the principle of ex ante efficiency-and not
at the later points where this principle is applied byjudges.
33 Cf Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing
CBA When Preferences Are
LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL
Distorted, in COST-BENEFrI ANALYSIS:
PERSPECrIVES 269, 300-05 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) (discussing
problem of "market adjustment" to governmental approval of inefficient programs).
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could other actors literally restore the possible world W that would
have resulted had the Agent chosen A, at 7' W, involves the Agent doing A, at 7, by hypothesis, the Agent has not done that.
Rather, the claim must be that there is some collective action A
which the Patients could choose at some time after T and which is
practically indistinguishable from A,. The Patients rationally would
choose A, if the Agent chooses A 2-thus, in effect, "overriding" A2 .
However, there may be no such collective action available to the Patients and rational for them to choose: both because of the potential
physical effects of A 2 (if the Agent drops a nuclear bomb at T, what
can the Patients do to reverse that?), and because of the potential
change in the Patients' information after T Further, even if some
such collective action, A,, exists, collective action problems or irrationality on the part of some or all of the Patients may prevent them
from agreeing on AC.
The moral Agent, choosing between A, and A 2, will consider the
possible upshots of these actions-including the possibility that A2 , if
universally dispreferred, will result in some subsequent collective
choice A, that the Agent views as practically indistinguishable from, or
worse than, the original A,. But the fact that A, is universally ex ante
preferred to A2 does not imply that some such A, would occur, or that
the Agent would predict it to occur. Ex ante inefficient choices are
not, necessarily, actually or predictably unstable.
F. Official Uncertainty
Up to this point, I have assumed that the legal official-our
Agent-is perfectly informed, although the citizens whose preferences
and interests she considers-the Patients-are not. What I have
shown, in effect, is that the decision in any choice situation by an
Agent who is (1) solely motivated by moral considerations; and (2)
perfectly informed would not be influenced by the rational ordering
of the Agent's choices by any Patient (if SEU is the correct account of
rationality). But what if we relax the assumption of perfect information on the Agent's part? Isn't the Patient's rational ordering an indicator, for an uncertain Agent, of what the Agent ought to do, in light
of one moral consideration-the Patient's welfare?
This raises the complex issue of moral decision making under uncertainty. For simplicity, and to make a strong case for the moral
force of ex ante preference, I will assume the following: morality is
consequentialist in structure, and the morally appropriate action un-
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der uncertainty is to maximize subjective or objective expected moral
goodness. That is: (1) each choice, A,, by the actor can be represented
as a lottery over possible worlds (where the probabilities in the lottery
are construed as representing either the actor's beliefs or the objective probabilities, depending on whether the expected moral goodness account is subjective or objective); (2) the comparative moral
goodness of possible worlds can be represented by a numerical
"goodness" function; (3) for each choice, an expected moral goodness
number can be calculated by using the probabilities in the matching
lottery to discount the goodness of the various possible outcomes and
then aggregating; and (4) the morally appropriate choice is the
choice with the largest expected goodness. "
Why does this account of moral choice under uncertainty generate a strong case for the moral force of rational approvability? It does
so by creating an isomorphism between (1) the moral ordering, by an
uncertain Agent, of the choices available to him; and (2) the rational
ordering, by an uncertain Patient, of the choices available to the
Agent. The Agent orders the choices in light of their expected moral
goodness; the Patient, in light of their subjective expected utility. Expected utility and expected moral goodness are methods for ranking
choices that start with a cardinal function of possible worlds (a utility
or goodness function), and then assign each choice a number equaling the probabilistically weighted average of the cardinal numbers assigned to all of the choice's possible outcomes.
Clearly, the Agent's expected-moral-goodness ranking of his
choices, and a given Patient's subjective-expected-utility ranking of the
same set of choices, can diverge once moral considerations other than
the Patient's welfare come into play. But the following Convergence
Claim is tempting: an uncertain Agent's expected-moral-goodness
ranking of his choices, in light of the Patient's welfare, and the Patient's
subjective-expected-utility ranking of those choices, are the same ranking. Assume the Convergence Claim is true. Imagine, further, that a
given choice, A* by an uncertain Agent is ex ante efficient; A* maximizes expected utility for all Patients. Imagine, finally, that welfare is
the only relevant moral consideration. Then it would follow that A* is
the morally appropriate (expected-moral-goodness maximizing)
choice for this uncertain Agent. In short, the Convergence Claim im-

34 See FUMERTON, supra note 2, at 90-128 (discussing "value adjusted possible consequence act consequentialist" conceptions of both rational and morally right action).
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plies that uncertain Agents morally should choose ex ante efficient actions, at least within a morality that is consequentialist and welfarist.
So is the Convergence Claim true? There are two important considerations that undermine the claim, one arguable and one quite
certain. First, the substantive rather than preferentialist account of
welfare is arguably correct. On the preferentialist account, the
Agent's ranking of possible worlds in light of the Patient's welfare will
necessarily track the Patient's own preferences over those outcomes.
On the substantive account, however, it need not. Second, and more
crucially, even if the preferentialist account of welfare is correct-so
that the Agent, focusing on the Patient's welfare, can equate his moral
goodness function with the Patient's utility function-it does not follow that the expected moral goodness for a given choice equals its
subjective expected utility. For the Agent, as for the Patient, each
choice, Ai, by the Agent is a lottery across possible worlds. But the
probability numbers in the lottery need not be the same. The numbers used
to calculate subjective expected utility are the Patient's subjective
probabilities; the numbers used to calculate expected moral goodness
are either the Agent's subjective probabilities or objective probabilities, both of which can deviate from the Patient's subjective probabilities.
Here is a silly example that makes the point quite obvious. There
is a lake outside the Patient's house. If the lake stays in its natural
state, the Patient's utility is 0. If the lake turns green, the Patient's
utility is 10. If the lake turns red, the Patient's utility is -10. The Agent
has a choice of dumping or not dumping some harmless colorant into
the lake. The objective probability that the colorant would turn the
lake green is 1/5 and that it would turn the lake red is 4/5. The
Agent's subjective probabilities are 3/10 and 7/10, respectively. However, the Patient's subjective probability of green conditional on
dumping is 3/5 and of red conditional on dumping is 2/5. The objective expected moral goodness of dumping is -6; the subjective expected moral goodness of dumping is -4; and the subjective expected
utility of dumping is 2. The choice by the Agent that is rationally approvable by the Patient is to dump the chemical; but the morally appropriate choice for the Agent in light of the Patient's welfare,
whether objective probabilities or the Agent's own subjective probabilities are used to generate the moral ordering, is to refrain from
dumping.
The morally appropriate action for an uncertain Agent is surely
sensitive to the probability that the various choices open to her will re-
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sult in morally better or worse outcomes. But it is an unwarranted
leap from this premise to the conclusion that the uncertain Agent
ought morally to be influenced by the ex ante preferences of the persons affected by her choices. Plausible normative accounts of choice
under uncertainty look either to the actor's subjective probabilities (as
does SEU), or to the objective probabilities. But the probability numbers used to determine each Patient's ex ante preference are different
from both of these; they are, by definition, the Patient's own subjective probabilities. Nor is it plausible to say that the Agent, acting under uncertainty, should rely on the subjective probabilities of the persons whom she affects, since she typically affects multiple persons with
potentially quite different subjective probabilities. The gambit of introducing uncertainty on the part of the Agent brings probability into
play-but not the probability numbers that determine, within SEU,
what is rationally approvable by each Patient.
G. Conclusion: The Moral Weight of Rational Approvability Within SEU
SEU ties rationality to subjective probabilities and preferences.
Both of these features undermine the claim that rational approvability, as given by SEU, has moral force. Tying rationality to preferencesatisfaction breaks the link between rational approvability and welfare-at least if welfare is itself a matter of enjoyment, friendship, accomplishment, knowledge, and other such values, and not of preference-satisfaction. SEU's reliance on subjective probabilities is an even
deeper problem. It vitiates the link between the Patient's preferences
over outcomes and her preferences over actions, since the Patient's
beliefs about which outcomes would result from which actions can be
mistaken. It creates intertemporal change in the Patient's preferences
over a particular set of actions since what the Patient believes can
change over time. Giving special moral weight to the preferences that
the Patient happens to hold at a particular time, merely in virtue of
their temporal location (e.g., to preferences contemporaneous with
the Agent's choices), seems arbitrary. SEU's reliance on subjective
probabilities drives a wedge between rational approvability and the varieties of hypothetical consent that arguably have moral force, such as
hypothetical, fully informed consent or hypothetical consent under
conditions of structured ignorance. Finally, it drives a wedge between
what is morally appropriate for an uncertain Agent, and what is rationally approvable by an uncertain Patient. If the Agent maximized
expected moral goodness, and the Patient maximized expected utility,
using the same objective probabilities, the two orderings by these two
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uncertain persons would converge (with some further assumptions).
SEU precludes this convergence.
Let us turn, then,. to consider the moral force of rational approvability within accounts of rationality that drop one, or both, of
these problematic features of SEU.
III. DOES RATIONAL APPROVABILITY HAVE MORAL WEIGHT?
ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF RATIONALITY

A. Objective Expected Utility
The objective expected utility (OEU) account of rationality
amends SEU by replacing subjective with objective probabilities.
OEU leaves the other features of an expected utility account in place:
the construal of each action as a lottery over possible outcomes; the
existence of a utility function representing the actor's preferences
over outcomes; and the identification of the rational choice as the
choice the expected utility of which (calculated within OEU using objective rather than subjective probabilities) is greatest. I take it that
"objective" probabilities are interpersonally-if not intertemporallyobjective; that is, where the Agent is choosing among [A,... A. at
time T, the objective probability that some choice, A i , will lead to
some outcome, W, is the same at T for all Patients affected by the
Agent's choice and for the Agent herselL An expected utility account
where probabilities are objective but relativized to particular persons
is sufficiently close to SEU that it does not merit separate consideration here. Furthermore, the proponents of OEU, and more generally
of objective probability, generally consider probabilities to be interpersonally objective.
Two standard accounts of probability contend within the modern
philosophical literature: Bayesian accounts, which construe probability as a degree of belief, a numerical measure of someone's partial belief; and frequentist accounts, which construe probability as the frequency with which objects (including persons, actions, or other
objects) in some reference class have some attribute.M A Bayesian ac-

See EELLS, supra note 2, at 31 (suggesting OEU as an alternative account of rationality to SEU).
36 Good overviews of the philosophical literature on probability include
L.
JONATHAN COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PIIILOSOP1HY OF INDUCTION AND
PROBABILITY (1989); DONALD GILLIES, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF PROBABILITY
(2000); HENRY E. KYBURG, PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC (1970); STORRS
95
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count that looks to the actual partial beliefs that persons possess generates subjective, not objective, probabilities: the subjective probabilities that figure in SEU. A Bayesian account that.looks to the partial
beliefs that persons ought to possess, given their evidence, generates
probabilities that are objective but not interpersonally-or intertemporally-so. 3 The Bayesian might, however, generate interpersonally-and intertemporally-objective probabilities by looking to the
partial beliefs that an idealized person, in possession of full information or a defined stock of information, would have. Where the Agent
at T is choosing among (A,... A,], the objective probability that
choice A, leads to outcome W is the numerical degree of belief that an
idealized person, with full or defined information, would attribute (at
all times) to the proposition "A results in "
Turning to frequentism, a crucial issue is how to specify the reference class within which to subsume any given action, so as to enable a
calculation of the frequency with which the action results in some type
of outcome. Consider the Agent's action, A, of placing benzene in a
lake near the forty-year-old Patient's home. What is the frequentist
probability that this action will result in the Patient's death from cancer? A, might be variously classified as "exposing a person to a toxin,"
"exposing a person to benzene," "exposing a person to benzene that is
dissolved in water," "exposing a forty-year-old person to benzene," and
so on. The frequency with which actions in the first class result in
cancer deaths differs from the frequency with which actions in the
second class do, and so forth. Frequentists differ in their proposals as
to the correct reference class for determining the probability that a
particular object (here, the particular action of placing benzene in the
lake) has an attribute (here, the attribute of being carcinogenic).
Some propose that the correct reference class is the conventionally salient class (the class in which ordinary members of the relevant society

MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE: SPACE-TIME, PROBABILITY, AND DECISION 141-47
OF PROBABILITY
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
ROY WEATHERFORD,
THEORY (1982); Colin Howson, Theories of Probability,46 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 1 (1995).
MCCALL,

A

(1994);

For presentations of the "probability calculus"-the numerical axioms that any account
of probability, be it Bayesian, frequentist, or other, must satisfy-see IAN HACKING, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC 23-78 (2001); RESNIK, supra
note 2, at 45-80; BRIAN SKYRMS, CHOICE AND CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO

INDUCTIVE LOGIC 130-59 (2d ed. 1975).
37 Of course the terms "subjective" and "objective"
are slippery. However, if the
beliefs of a person idealized in one way or another are seen to be suitably "objective"in that they can differ from the actual beliefs that person happens to possess-then Bayesian (i.e., degree-of-belief) accounts of probability can generate objective probabilities.
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would subsume the object); others that it is the statistical class (the
narrowest class for which reliable frequency information is available);
and still others that it is the physicalclass (the class consisting of objects sharing all the causally relevant characteristics of the object in
381
question).
Using conventionally salient or statistical reference
classes will produce frequentist probabilities that are interpersonally,
but not intertemporally, objective while using physical reference
classes will produce frequentist probabilities that are both interpersonally and intertemporally objective.
If rational choice and approval is defined by OEU rather than
SEU, does the fact that some action, A*, by an Agent at time T is rationally approvable by a Patient at 7' create a moral reason for the
Agent to choose that action? A crucial obstacle here is that OEU incorporates a numerical ranking of outcomes, "utility," that depends
on the Patient's preferences over the outcomes. If a substantive rather
than preferentialist account of welfare is correct-and there are plausible reasons to believe this is the case 3 ---the fact that the Patient prefers outcome W to W neither (1) means that W is better than W for
the Patient's welfare; nor (2) means that W is better for the Patient in
some other way (for example, by enhancing his agency). Even if objective probabilities reflect full information, 0 and a fortiori if objective
probabilities are defined in some other way, A* might be rationally
approvable by the Patient but not lead to the outcome best for her
welfare or best for her in some other way. Nor, on a substantive account of welfare, will it necessarily be true that the morally appropriate choice for the uncertain Agent, in light of the Patient's welfare, is
A*-however objective probabilities are defined. The morally appropriate choice for the uncertain Agent, in light of the Patient's welfare,
is a product of a goodness function, that ranks outcomes with respect
to the Patient's welfare, plus the probabilities (in some sense) of the
various actions available to the Agent leading to the various possible
outcomes. But on a substantive account of welfare, this goodness
function need not track the Patient's utility function.
38For a discussion of the role of reference classes in determining frequentist
probabilities, and of these particular types of classes, see Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death
and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2003).

39 See, e.g.,
GRIFFIN, supra note 19, at 21-29 (advancing considerations against
the
"taste model" of well-being).
40 Objective probabilities would reflect full information if they were
defined in
Bayesian fashion as the degrees of belief of fully informed persons, or in frequentist
fashion as frequencies relative to physical reference classes.
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Shift, now, to a preferentialist view of welfare. The fact that A* is
rationally approvable by the Patient still does not entail that W*, which
in fact results from A*, is best for the Patient. Welfare luck is possible.
The only way to make the rational approvability of A* within OEU imply the welfare goodness of W* is (1) to have the objective probabilities reflect full information; and even then only if (2) the universe is
deterministic (so that fully informed persons would always know for
certain which outcomes will result from which actions). But fullinformation objective probabilities, in a deterministic universe, will
always be 0 or 1, never in between. Thus the version of OEU just described violates two truisms of welfare and rationality: it makes welfare
luck impossible (i.e., the rationally approvable action for the Patient
necessarily produces the outcome that is best for her welfare), and it
precludes probabilities greater than 0 and less than 1 (but surely the
rational choice is sometimes a choice that reflects objective or subjective uncertainty) 4
Let us focus, now, on the choices of an Agent who is himself uncertain. If an uncertain Agent's morally appropriate course is to
maximize expected moral goodness-using the same interpersonally
objective probabilities that determine the Patient's expected utilityand if the Agent's moral goodness ranking of outcomes, in light of the
Patient's welfare, tracks the Patient's utility ranking of outcomes, then
it follows that: the choice A* that maximizes the Patient's objective
expected utility is necessarily also the choice that maximizes objective
expected moral goodness, in light of the Patient's welfare. This is true
regardless of how objective probabilities are defined-even if, most
plausibly, they do not reflect full information. In short, the morally
appropriate choice for the uncertain Agent, in light of the Patient's
41

In addition, the "final-preference" gambit is not strengthened by the shift to

OEU. My objections to that gambit within SEU were: (1) it makes welfare luck impossible; (2) a person's final-preference ranking of pairs of worlds will often be undefined,
specifically where the worlds are not linked by some actor's choice; and (3) a person's
probability assessments vary over time, and giving weight to her probability assessments
contemporaneous with the choice situation generating the final-preference ranking
seems arbitrary. The first and second problems are not avoided by any version of
OEU; the third is only avoided by a version that precludes intertemporal variation in
objective probabilities.
The nonconsequentialist variant of the welfare argument for the moral force of
rational approvability, supra Part IIB, is also not substantially bolstered by the shift
from SEU to OEU. At least for what would seem to be the most plausible specifications
of objective probability, namely frequentist probabilities relative to conventional or
statistical reference classes, the problems facing SEU-intertemporal variation in preference and the questionable moral relevance of the instrumental calculations underlying the Patient's ex ante preference for some action by the Agent-also face OEU.
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welfare, and the choice rationally approvable by the Patient will be the
same. The move from SEU to OEU permits this convergence by
eliminating the possible deviation between the probabilities relevant
for the Agent's moral choice and the probabilities relevant for the Patient's rational approval. But the convergence, crucially, will not occur except on a preferentialist view of welfare-a view that, as I have
said, is problematic.
Moving away from considerations of welfare, and from a consequentialist moral framework, the proponent of the moral force of rational approvability might point to hypothetical consent. If objective
probabilities reflect full information, then the fact that the Patient rationally approves A* implies that the Patient would consent to A* under full information. If objective probabilities are defined, alternatively, as the degrees of belief of persons possessing a morally ideal
stock of partial information-for example, persons in a state of radical
Rawlsian ignorance-then the fact that the Patient rationally approves
A* implies that the Patient would consent to A* if partially informed
in this ideal way. But there are real difficulties in equating the probabilities that bear on rational choice with the probabilities of fully informed, or ideally uninformed, persons. Here is yet another plausible
truism of rationality: what is rational for a person depends upon her
actual beliefs, or at least on her actual evidence (for example, on the
beliefs she is warranted in holding given that evidence), or at least on
the evidence she would possess had she gathered evidence appropriately. As Richard Fumerton, in criticizing the view that equates rational choice with choice under full information, observes:
If I were to know all of the information that bears on some decision, I
might well act in ways that in fact I have every reason to believe would be
disastrous. But surely we want to make the rational ... course of action
for me to take a function of my epistemic situation. 42
The definitions of objective probability just considered, which
create a link between rational approvability and hypothetical consent
under morally significant conditions, radically depart from the actor's
own "epistemic situation." More generally, Fumerton's point calls
into question all OEU accounts-although there could be such accounts where the deviation from the actor's epistemic situation is less
pronounced, for example, where objective probabilities are defined in
frequentist fashion and relative to conventional or statistical rather
than physical classes.

42

FUMERTON, supra note 2, at 102-03.
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In sum, although the issues are complex, it does not seem that
there is an OEU account of rationality that both (1) is in fact a plausible account of what rational choice consists in, and (2) makes the rational approvability, by some Patient, of some Agent's choice, a morally relevant consideration for that Agent.
B. Subjective Expected Value and ObjectiveExpected Value
The subjective expected value (SEV) and objective expected value
(OEV) accounts of rationality suppose that there is a cardinal index of
the value of different outcomes, (V(W)), which plays a role in determining the rational choice parallel to the role that the utility index
plays within SEU. '43 Each possible action can be represented as a lottery across possible worlds
1 •... p, /, with the probabilities given by a
measure of the actor's actual beliefs (SEV), or by some objective
measure (OEV). SEV and OEV then specify the rational action as that
action the expected value of which-p,*V(W,) + p2 *V(W) + . . . +
p*V(W,).is greatest. For simplicity, assume that the value index
measures the value for the actor (the welfare-value, agency-value, or
some such sense) of the various possible outcomes.
On an SEV account of rationality, does the rational approvability
of some Agent's choice by a Patient create a moral reason for the
Agent? I suggest not. I argued in Part II that rational approvability,
within SEU, lacks moral weight-both because the numerical index
(utility) of outcomes within SEU does not track their welfare-value for
the Patient, and on various other grounds. Shifting from SEU to SEV
potentially eliminates the divergence between the numerical index of
outcomes (now a value index) and their welfare-value for th'e Patient;
it does not, however, eliminate the other objections to the claim that
rational approvability has moral weight. Note the following objections
that still obtain: (1) because he does not know for certain which outcomes result from which actions, a Patient might rationally approve an
action the outcome of which is worse for him than the outcome of
some alternative action open to the Agent; (2) the gambits of responding to this objection by creating "final preferences" over outcomes that necessarily track the Patient's rational approvals, or by
shifting to a nonconsequentialist construal of welfare, are unsuccess-

43 See

EELLS, supra note 2, at 31 (presenting OEV and SEV accounts of rationality

as alternatives to SEU).
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ful; 44 (3) appeal to considerations of agency does not work, again because the Patient lacks certain knowledge, and might maximize subjective expected value by choosing an action that results in an outcome which is worse for his agency than alternatives; (4) hypothetical
consent does not do the trick, since the Patient's subjective probabilities are based on his actual stock of information, rather than reflecting full information or a morally ideal stock of partial information;
and (5) the choice that maximizes SEV for the Patient is not necessarily the morally appropriate choice for an uncertain Agent, since that
choice would depend either on the Agent's own subjective probabilities (which can deviate from the Patient's) or on the objective probabilities.
OEV circumvents some, not all, of these objections. It bolsters an
argument from hypothetical consent if objective probabilities are defined as the probabilities that persons possessing full information, or a
morally ideal stock of partial information, would possess. But as I argued in the prior Section, there are real difficulties in equating the
probabilities that bear on rationalchoice with the probabilities of fully
informed, or ideally uninformed, persons. OEV also serves to tighten
the link between what is rationally approvable for a Patient and what is
morally appropriate for an uncertain Agent in light of the Patient's
welfare. However objective probabilities are defined, within OEV, if
the appropriate choice for the uncertain Agent is to maximize expected moral goodness using these objective probabilities, then rational
approvability does have a kind of moral weight for the Agent. Note,
crucially, that the argument does not depend on specifying objective
probabilities as reflecting full information, or morally ideal partial inThe "final-preference" gambit within SEV would say that a Patient has a "protovalue" ranking of worlds, measured by a numerical value index, and that the world actually resulting from a choice maximizing subjective expected proto-value for the Patient is better for her than the world resulting from another choice in the same choice
situation. But this gambit (as within SEU) makes welfare luck impossible; it means that
the final welfare ranking of two worlds, for a person, might often be undefined; and it
runs up against the problem of intertemporal variation in subjective probabilities.
The nonconsequentialist welfare gambit within SEV would say that the SEVmaximizing action by the Agent is better for the Patient's welfare than alternative actions, even if the world resulting from that action is not better than the worlds resulting from the alternative actions. Here, too, the objections considered above, in analyzing SEU, are not dissipated. The SEV-maximizing action by the Agent as determined
using the Patient's subjective probabilities at the time of choice might not be the SEVmaximizing action as determined using the Patient's subjective probabilities at some
other time. And an action might maximize SEV for the Patient but simply have instrumental, not intrinsic, welfare value; if so, the (fully informed) Agent would seemingly have no moral reason to take that action.
44
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formation. Imagine that objective probabilities are, instead, frequencies relative to statistical reference classes; if these probabilities both
drive rational choice and moral choice under uncertainty, then the
argument for the moral weight of rational approvability goes through.
But is it plausible that there are interpersonally objective probabilities which determine rational choice (hence are not defined in
terms of full information or morally ideal partial information) and
also determine moral choice? The problem of moral choice under
uncertainty has not been discussed at great length in the philosophical literature,45 and it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore
that problem in detail, much less propose a particular account. Let
me merely note some possible accounts-for simplicity, ones that
could be proposed within a consequentialist moral framework. One
conceivable view is that the morally appropriate choice, regardless of
the Agent's information, is the choice that produces the best outcome. Another is that the morally appropriate choice is the choice
that a fully informed Agent, maximizing expected moral goodness,
46
would choose .
Yet another view is that the morally appropriate
choice is the choice that the Agent, with her actual subjective probabilities, maximizing subjective expected goodness, would choose. Yet
another is this: we calculate the probabilities that the Agent ought to
ascribe to outcomes, given her actual information (or the information
she ought to have), and ask what choice maximizes expected goodness given those probabilities. The view under consideration-that
there are interpersonally objective probabilities, distinct from fullinformation or morally-ideal-partial-information probabilities, that determine the morally appropriate choice-differs from all of these.
But is it plausible that moral assessment concerns neither (1) what actually happens, or what idealized (fully informed) actors would
choose; nor (2) what the actor should choose, given her actual epistemic situation (given her actual probabilistic beliefs, or the beliefs
she ought to have given her actual information, or the beliefs she
ought to have given the information she ought to have given actual
prior information or beliefs)? I doubt it.
Note further that the claimed convergence between what is rational (given OEV) for the Patient to approve, and what is morally appropriate for the uncertain Agent to do in light of the Patient's wel-

45 For a recent attempt to address the problem, see TED LOCKI-IART,
MORAL
UNCERTAINTY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (2000).
46 If we assume indeterminism, this latter view differs from the first.
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fare, does not demonstrate that rational approvability has moral
weight in a foundational sense. Rational approvability is not an independent and irreducible factor that, among others, determines what
the Agent ought morally to do.47 Rather, what the Agent morally
ought to do is determined by (1) the various factors bearing upon the
moral goodness of outcomes; and (2) the probabilities that various
possible actions will lead to various outcomes, Rational approvability
may track moral rightness, given OEV, but it does not determine it.
Consider, by contrast, the fact that the Patient would suffer terrible
pain in some outcome W'* This fact bears upon, and may change,
what the Agent ought to do in light of the Patient's welfare, nor can it
be reduced to other welfare-relevant considerations.
C. Realized Utility and Realized Value
A realized utility (RU) account of rationality ignores subjective or
objective probabilities, and instead looks to actual outcomes: the rational choice is identified, here, as the choice the actual outcome of
which maximizes the actor's utility. A realized value (RV) account,
too, looks to actual outcomes, but the relevant feature of actual outcomes is their value for the actor, in some sense-e.g., their welfarevalue or agency-value-rather than the extent to which the outcomes
satisfy her preferences.
Given RU, the rationally approvable action for the Patient is necessarily the action with the best outcome for the Patient's welfare if,
and only if, the preferentialist view of welfare is correct. Given RV, assuming the "value" of outcomes is their welfare-value for the actor, the
choice that is rationally approvable by the Patient is necessarily the
choice with the best outcome for her welfare-regardless of whether
the preferentialist view, the substantive view, or some other view of
welfare is correct. RV thus creates a tight link between rational approvability and moral weight (since the Patient's welfare does, of
course, have moral weight for the Agent); the preferentialist, at least,
will also see RU as creating this link.
But RU and RV are, I suggest, highly implausible accounts of rationality. Surely the rational choice, in a given choice situation-or at
least some choice situations-depends upon the probabilities with
47 See generally SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS (1998)

(presenting a general
template for moral theories that makes moral assessment depend on moral "factors").
48 SeeFUMERTON, supra note 2, at 102-13 (presenting, but then rejecting, the "actual consequence act consequentialist" account of rational and morally right action).
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which different possible outcomes might result from the various actions available to the actor-be they subjective probabilities, objective
Bayesian probabilities, objective frequentist probabilities, or probabilities in some other sense. This is the central insight of SEU, whatever
its other flaws. RU and RV are detached, not only from the actor's
epistemic situation, but from probability of any kind.
D. Other Accounts of Rationality
The alternative accounts of rationality considered in this Part are
all cousins of SEU, in the sense that they all make rationality a function of the outcomes possibly resulting from choice and, with the exception of RU and RV, the subjective or objective probabilities of
those outcomes. SEU, OEU, SEV, OEV, RU, and RV, however, hardly
exhaust the set of possible or plausible accounts of rationality.
Whether rational approvability has moral weight within "plan" accounts of rationality, "deontological" accounts, "expressive" accounts,
"minimax" and "maximax" accounts, and yet others that have been
advanced within the philosophical literature, is an issue that I cannot
pursue here."9
CONCLUSION
In considering the moral force of ex ante efficiency, it is crucial to
distinguish between a person's ex ante preference for some action
and the goodness of that action for her welfare or in some other way.
An action might maximize someone's subjective expected utility but
not lead to the outcome best for her welfare (or best in some other
way), since the subjective expected utility calculation depends, in part,
on the person's actual beliefs-the beliefs of an actual human being
lacking full information. A sophisticated response to this point is that
ex ante preference and, more generally, rational approvability possess
moral weight independent from the initial goodness of outcomes:
that the actor has a moral reason to choose an action rationally approvable by some person even if that action doesn't lead to the outcome best for the person's welfare, or best in some other way; or
(even more subtly) that the outcomes resulting from rationally appro-

Many of these alternatives to SEU are discussed in VARIETIES OF PRACTICAL.
REASONING (Elijah Millgram ed., 2001).
49
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vable actions are, in the final analysis, the best outcomes for that per50
son.
In this Article, I have attempted (among other things) to rebut
the sophisticated response. The rational approvability of some action
by some Patient is indeed morally irrelevant for the Agent who might
choose that action-morally irrelevant both in the sense that rational
approvability lacks the foundational moral weight that would be relevant to a perfectly informed Agent, and in the sense that rational approvability does not indicate to an uncertain Agent which choice,
morally, he ought to perform.
Assume my analysis succeeds. Can the proponent of ex ante efficiency defend its moral weight in some other way? Perhaps she might
concede that ex ante preference generally lacks moral force but suggest that the universal convergence of everyone's ex ante preference
on some action is a singular case in which the Agent now does have a
moral reason to perform that action. Is the suggestion persuasive? I
will have to leave that issue for another day. Still, my analysis (if cogent) has advanced the debate about ex ante efficiency by eliminating
one important kind of argument in its favor.

This even more subtle line of argument is the "final-preference gambit" that I
described and criticized above. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16 and notes 41,
44 (explaining objections to that gambit within SEU, OEU, and SEV).

